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Abstract
Economic  developmenit  necessarily  chaniges the welfare  the maximii  priniciple. This principle offers  a ullifying
of socioCcololilic  groups to various degrees,  dependinig  framework  for analyzing  the socioeconiomic  impact of
on  differenctes  in  their social arrangements.  The  public  policy  by using a wvide  variety of evaluationi
challenge  for policvyrakers  is to select  the changes  that  functions,  inequality  indicators (like the extended  Gini
will  be most socially  desirable.  Essama-Nssaih  coefficient),  and poverry  indices  (such as Sen's index and
demonistrates  the usefulness  of distributional  analysis  for  the meilimbrs of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  family).
social  evaluation  and, more  specifically,  for welfare  The author also  examines,  within the context  of
evaluatioll,  uislig data from the  1994  Integrated  commodity  taxation,  oiow to  identify socially desirable
Houseihold  Survey  in  Guinea. Because  the  inttrinationial  policy  options usinlg  both the dominance  criterion  and
commiiiunity  has declared  poverty  eradication  a  abbreviated  social welfare  fulictions.  He  includes
fundamental  objective  of developmeit,  the autIlor  uses  a  computer  roLitinies  for calculating  various welfare  indices
poverty-focused  approach  to social evaluationi  based on  and for plotting the relevant concenltrationi  curves.
This paper-a product of the Poverty Reductio n Group, Poverty  Reduction and Economilic Management Net-work-is  part
of a  larger effort  in  the network  to  ulinlerstand  the povertx  and social  impa;ct  of public  policy.  Copies  of the paper  are
available free from the World Bank,  181 8 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 204.3.3.  Please contact Oykiao Kootzeniew, room
XIC4-554,  telephone  202-473-5075,  fax  202-522-3283X  , email  address  okootzemew\(@wvorldbanik.org.  Policy  Research
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
bessamilanissah@(-  w\vorldbank.org.  September 2002.  (50  pages)
The  lPolic  Research  Workinzg  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findinigs  of wuork  in  pro)gress  to) enicou rage  the  excanige of ideas  abouit
developmient issues-An  obiective oo  the series is to get the findinis soit quickl),  vien  if tbe presentations are less than fullid  polished.  The
papers  carry the names of the aothors a1nd shooild be cited according/v.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
ps/Pcr are  entirely those  o/  the authors.  IThey  do nzot  necessar)il  represent  the  viewv of the World  Bank, its Execitive  l)irectors,  or the
coitiitr-ics they represenit.
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The purpose of this paper is to fit distributional  impact analysis within the logic of
social evaluation and to illustrate  its implementation using data from the  1994 Integrated
Household  Survey  in  Guinea'.  The  perspective  of  development  as  empowerment,
advocated  by  Sen(1999)  and  outlined  in  the  World  Development  Report  (WDR)
2000/2001,  entails  essentially  the  expansion  and  the  distribution  of  socioeconomic
opportunities  with implications  for  individual  and  collective  well-being.  Distributional
analysis,  a key  input  in policy  formulation  and  evaluation,  involves  a  comparison  of
alternative distributions of some indicator of the living  standard.
There  is  an  intimate  relationship  between  evaluation  and  development  to  the
extent  that  the  very definition  of development  involves  an  evaluative  judgment.  The
domain of development  hinges on the notion of the things that are worth promoting (Sen
1989).  The  concept  of living  standard  therefore  plays  a fundamental  role both in  the
formulation  of  development  objectives  and  in  the  assessment  of  development
effectiveness.  However,  this  multidimensional  concept  is  not  easy  to  implement
empirically.  The identification of the valuable dimensions of the living standard depends
essentially on the underlying view about personal characteristics  and social  arrangements
that are deemed important in the realization of any life plan.
The  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  set  by  the  United  Nations  with
respect  to  development  and  poverty  eradication  are  consistent  with  the  empowerment
approach  to  development.  They  identify  income,  health,  education, shelter  and
governance as  critical  components  of the living  standard.  In general these  goals are  set
for the year 2015  relative to 1990  and are meant to provide guidance to both national  and
international  policies and programs.  For our current purposes, we select consumption per
capita as  an indicator  of opportunities  for well-being  at the  household  level.  It will be
obvious  that  the  methodology  discussed  in  this paper  can easily  be  extended  to  other
dimensions of living that may be represented by a quantitative variable  distributed over a
population.
Fundamentally,  evaluation  involves  the  examination  and  weighing  of  a
phenomenon  according  to  some  explicit  or  implicit  yardstick  (Weiss2 1998).  We  can
leam  a  great  deal  about  an  evaluative  approach  by  distinguishing  the  information
required  for passing  judgments from that which has no direct evaluative role (Sen 1999).
The information  pertains  to  the valuable aspects of the  object of evaluation,  and  to the
rule for combining these  valuable  elements into  an  aggregative judgment.  For instance,
the  utilitarian approach to social  evaluation is based on the utility sum total in the social
states  under  consideration.  In this  framework,  attention  is focused  on  individual  well-
' Enquete Integrale  avec Module Budget-Consommation (EIBC).  The survey was carried out by the
National Statistical Office within the Ministry of Plan and Cooperation.
2 More  explicitly,  this author defines  evaluation as "a systematic assessment  of the operation and/or  the
outcomes  of a program  or  policy,  compared  to  a  set  of explicit  or  implicit  standards, as  a  means  of
contributing  to the improvement of the program or policy".
1being  as represented  by the concept of utility, and the goodness  of a social state depends
on the sum total of utilities associated with that state  [regardless of how these utilities are
distributed among individuals  (Sen 1999)].
Widespread  poverty in  the  developing world remains  a serious  challenge  for the
development  community  and  may have  prompted  the  inclusion  of poverty  eradication
among  the  MDGs.  The  World  Bank  has  declared  poverty  reduction  its  overarching
objective  and a benchmark  measure of its performance  as  a development  institution.  In
view of these considerations,  we emphasize  poverty-focused  evaluation in this paper.  If
development  is about  empowering people to take charge of their  destinies (Wolfensohn
1998), then poverty must be  seen as  the deprivation of basic capabilities  to lead the kind
of life  one  has  reason  to  value  (Sen  1999).  In  this  perspective,  the  identification  of
poverty must go beyond lowness  of income.  This invitation however  does not deny the
fact  that  inadequate  income  can  lead  to  capability  deprivation.  The  notion  of relative
deprivation plays an important role in shaping the evaluative  framework discussed  here.
In the context  of applied  policy analysis,  it is not  enough  to have  an  analytical  or
evaluative  framework,  available  data  must be  processed  according  to  that  framework  in
order to  draw relevant conclusions.  Invariably,  one needs  a computing  platform  to do  the
job.  We propose  to show that the syntax of EViews can easily be exploited to do the job at
hand.  EViews  stands for Econometric Views,  a Windows version of a software designed by
Quantitative  Micro Software  (QMS)  for the processing of time series data and the conduct
of econometric  analysis.  We find that many people who are already using EViews for other
purposes  and interested  in  distributional  issues  may  not necessarily  be  familiar  with  the
fundamental  concepts and techniques  of distributional  analysis.  In  addition,  depending on
their level of mastery of the software, they may not even think of EViews as appropriate  for
handling household  survey data.  Yet the current version of the  software  (Version  4.1) can
handle 4 million observations per series (variable) and the total number of observations (i.e.
number of variables times  the number  of observations  per  variable)  is limited only by the
available  Random  Access  Memory  (RAM).  In  addition  the  syntax  is  sufficiently  strait-
forward  to  allow  the  user  to  plot  common  curves  such  as  cumulative  distributions,
concentration  or  Lorenz  curves.  It  is  also  easy  to  compute  indices  of social  welfare,
inequality and poverty.
The  outline  of the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  poverty-focused
evaluation  framework  based  on  the  maximin  principle.  The  concept  of  relative
deprivation underpins  the distribution of social weights  in the formulation of aggregative
judgments.  Section  3 focuses  on the implications  of the  traditional  approach to  poverty
analysis  based  on  the  use  of a  poverty  line.  In  particular,  it  is  shown  that  when  the
distribution of welfare  is truncated on the basis of a poverty line, the Gini coefficient  can
be  additively  decomposed  into  two  components,  one  measuring  the  within  group
inequality  and  the  other  the  inter-group  inequality.  Impact  analysis  is  reviewed  in
Section  4.  In that  Section,  we  show  how the  ranking of socioeconomic  situations  can
vary with the specification  of social weights.  The basic EViews routines used to produce
illustrations  are provided  in boxes.  Concluding remarks  are presented  in the last Section
of the paper.
22.  Maximin Approach  to Poverty-Focused Evaluation
A poverty  assessment is a key ingredient in the formulation of a poverty reduction
strategy.  It is  a determination  of the  nature,  extent and determinants of poverty at both
the individual and societal level.  Ultimately,  such an assessment is an exercise in social
evaluation  to  the  extent  that  it  offers  a  criterion  for  comparing  alternative  social
arrangements.  Before  considering  the  implied distribution  of social  weights,  we  first
review the logic of evaluation.
The Logic of Social Evaluation
The notion of evaluation is usually contrasted  with that of valuation.  The former
relates  to  the assessment of the relative  merits of actions  while  the  latter applies  to the
comparison  of  things  (Dasgupta  2000).  Thus,  evaluation  applies  to  strategies  and
policies3. Essentially,  evaluation  entails  four basic  aspects:  (1)  the  identification of the
object of evaluation  along with its valuable dimensions;  (2) the valuation of the various
components of the object;  (3) the formulation of an overall  judgment; and (4) the ranking
of alternatives.
We  can  learn  a  great deal  about  an  evaluative  approach  by distinguishing  the
information required  for passing  judgments from that which has no direct evaluative role
(Sen 1999).  The information pertains to the valuable aspects of the object of evaluation,
and  to  the  rule  for  combining these  valuable  elements  into  an  aggregative  judgment.
When seen  as  an  assessment  of individual  advantage  and  social progress,  the object of
social evaluation is  the  determination of the  extent  to  which  the prevailing social
arrangements maintain and  improve  the  living  standard of the participants.  The
distribution of the living standard within the population  is thus the yardstick by which we
judge the  performance  of a socioeconomic  system.  The  identification  of the valuable
dimensions  of the  living  standard  corresponds  to the  specification  of what  Sen (2000)
calls the focal space of evaluation.
To  arrive  at  an  overall judgment,  one  needs  to aggregate  individual  conditions
into  an indicator of a  social state.  In Sen's terminology,  this aggregation rule represents
the focal combination.  One standard approach is to define an additively separable social
welfare function as follows.
(2.1)  W =  jhxh
h=1
where  ph  is  the  social  weight  attached  to  the  level  of the  welfare  of individual  (or
household)  h,  as indicated  by  xh.  We may invoke  the concept  of Equally Distributed
3A strategy  is a  conditional action  that depends  on the  state of the world or on actions  taken by other
decision  makers.  A policy  is a definite  course of action chosen from a feasible  set to govern  current and
future actions.  A policy statement identifies objectives and associated means.
3Equivalent (EDE) welfare to abbreviate the above function as follows: W(VP)=W(x).  VP
is  -he level of welfare  such that, if enjoyed equally by each member of society, collective
well-being  would be  equivalent  to  the  one  associated  with  the  observed  distribution4.
The  definition  of the  covariance  between  two  variables  allows  us to  express  the  EDE
welfare as:
(2.2)  V6n  h=-  xh  =  ,pufX  +cov(x,f)
where both  f  and  x  are n-dimensional  vectors.  No  generality  is lost if we normalized
social weights such that  p=l.  In that case, average social welfare could be written as:
(2.3)  V  =  x + cov(x,, )
The covariance  term would be equal to zero if either ,  or x were constant.  A constant  x
means that everybody has the same level of living,  and therefore there is no inequality to
worry about.  However,  a constant  1 means  everybody  receives  equal  consideration  in
social evaluation regardless of her/his standard of living.  In this case, social evaluation is
not concerned  with  inequality.  Thus,  expressions  (2.2)  and  (2.3)  may be  viewed  as  a
decomposition  of the  social  welfare  function  into  the size and distribution components.
The former is represented by the mean of the distribution of the living standard indicator,
while the second is measured by the covariance  between the social weights  and the levels
of the living standard.
The focal space and the focal  combination define the informational basis of social
evaluation.  This may be viewed as a set of value judgments  underlying  the specification
of the objects  of value both from the individual and social perspective.  Once the relevant
indicator  of the  living  standard  has  been  selected,  the  specification  of a  social  welfare
function  boils down  to  the distribution  of social weights  through  the specification  of ph
for each individual or class of individuals.  How can one go about this? One possibility is
to invoke a theory of social  justice to guide the distribution of social weights.  We use the
maximin principle in building up a poverty-focused  evaluative framework.
Distribution of Social Weights
A focus on poverty in social evaluation requires that extra consideration  be given
to the worse-off relative to the better-off both analytically and politically.  Sen (1997:  33)
explains  the ethical underpinning of the ordinary Gini coefficient  in terms of the pairwise
maximin principle. According to this criterion the welfare level of any pair of individuals
must be  equated  to the welfare  of the worse off of the two.  This  is consistent  with the
Dalton principle of transfers  according  to  which  rich  to  poor  transfers  improve  social
welfare.  This value judgment may be built in the social welfare  function  by first ranking
4 The  concept  is  used  by  Atkinson  (1970)  in  a  normative  approach  to  the  measurement  of  income
inequality.
4individuals  according  to some criterion of social desert, then assigning social weights in
such  a  way that  of any  two  individuals  the  more  deserving  receives  a higher  weight.
More  specifically,  suppose  that  we  rank  individuals  according  to  their  level  of
consumption  xh, then we assign social weights on the basis of ranks in such a way that if
h<i,  then  phg3i  . The  Dalton principle  is  therefore  consistent  with  any  nonnegative,
monotonic  and  weakly  decreasing  social  weighing  scheme  ph  (Mayshar  and  Yitzhaki
1995: 797).
One  such  weighing  scheme  underpins  the  class of social  evaluation  functions
associated with the Gini family of inequality indices.  To see what is involved,  consider a
group  of  v  individuals  selected  at  random  from  a  large  population.  A  particular
individual with a level of well-being  xh will feel relatively deprived if there is at least one
other individual with a higher level of living than xh.  The likelihood that the other (v-1)
individuals  have a level of well-being  higher than  xh is estimated  as:  (1  - ph )V-  where
ph iS an  estimate of the cumulative  distribution  fimction of x in the population  (CDF) at
the point xh.  We may select normalized social weights 5 such that:
(2.4)  W"(v)  = V(l _ph)V-;  _Wh(V) = 1
n h-l
Given  that the  CDF is  monotonically  increasing  between  0  and  1, it is clear  that the
weights  defined  in  (2.4)  will  decrease  monotonically  as  we  move  from  the  lower  to
higher ranking individuals,  in terms of living standard.
Average welfare  in the whole society is thus equal to:
(2.5)
V(v)  =- Iw  (v)xX  = v cov[x, (  P)  ] +  P.,, + v cov[x,(  p) v]
n h=1  V
If there  were  no  inequality  (i.e.  everyone  had  the  same level  of living  standard),  the
covariance  in the  above  expression  would  be equal to zero  and average  living  standard
would be equal  to pt.  We therefore  conclude that the  social cost of inequality is  equal
to: v cov[x, (1-  p)"- 1 ] . It is known that  V(v) =  ,[1  - G(v)], where G(v) is the extended
Gini  coefficient  and v  is  interpreted  as  an indicator  of social  aversion  to  inequality
(Lamnbert  1993b).  Therefore,  expression  (2.5)  implies  that the extended Gini  coefficient
is equal to:
(2.6)  G(v)  - cov[x, (I _ P)V-]
5  The fact that the average weight is equal to one can be established much easily in the case of a continuous
distribution.  In this case, we have:  j (1 - p) v  dp = --- v(l - p) v- dp =-
5The ordinary Gini coefficient is obtained by setting the aversion parameter  equal to 26.
What happens if individuals  are ranked according  to some variable  other than x?
For instance,  let y stand  for an indicator of needs.  Then rank  individuals  in such a way
that  the  neediest  comes  first.  Let  q  stand  for the  cumulative  distribution  under  y.  The
covariance expression now becomes  cov[x, (1-  q)V- 1 ].  The average welfare  is:
(2.7)  V(v)  = y/l  [1- Ca (v)]
where  C.y(v)  is  the  extended  concentration  index  of x  with  respect  to  y  defined  as
follows:
(2.8)  C  v (v)  = -- cov[x, (  - q)V-l]
Figure  2.1  reveals  the  weighing  scheme  associated  with  the  social  evaluation
criterion defined by (2.3).  The scheme is a function of the aversion parameter (v).  When
this parameter is equal  to one, the social evaluation  function, V(1),  assigns equal weight
to everyone regardless of their level of well-being.  This weight  is also equal to one.  For
all  values  of the  aversion  parameter  greater  than  1, the  poorest  individual  receives  a
weight equal  to v.  Next, all people whose rank falls below the cut-off point (where the v-
level  curve  is  equal  to  one)  receive  a  weight  between  v  and  1.  Finally,  the  social
evaluation  function assigns  a weight between zero  and one to people  whose relative  rank
falls  between  the  cut-off point and  1.  On  the  basis of figure  2.1,  it is  clear that as the
aversion parameter  increases  above  one, the distribution  of social  weights  is tilted such
that the weight assigned to the poorest equal v and that assigned to the richest equal zero.
The figure suggests that the cut-off rank is a solution to the following equation.
(2.9)  v(l _  p)v-l  =1
Thus  the rank  at which the  social  weight  switches from being greater  or  equal to one to
less than one is given by the following formula:
(2.10)  p  1[vI
6 In that case, we note  that:
--  cov[x, (1 - p)] = -- [cov(x,l) - cov(x, p)] =-cov(x, p)  = G.  This expression says
jul  jux  Ax
that the ordinary Gini coefficient  is equal to twice the covariance between x and its relative  rank, divided
by the mean of x.
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Table  2.1  shows  cut-off ranks  computed  according  to  (2.10).  These  results
suggest that the cut-off rank is a decreasing  function of the  aversion parameter.  As this
parameter increases,  the  focus is shifted to the lower end of the distribution.  Thus social
evaluation  will attach  more weight to the situation  of the poorest  group.  For instance,
when the aversion  parameter is  equal to  100,  social  evaluation  attaches  more weight  to
the lowest 5 percent of the distribution.  When the  aversion  level reaches  200, the  focus
shifts  to  the  poorest  3 percent  of the  population.  According  to  this  table,  the  social
evaluation  function based on the ordinary  Gini coefficient  assigns  more weight to every
body up to the median.  The weights then decline at a constant rate of 0.5 from 2 to 0.
Table 2.1.  Cut-off Rank as a Function of the Aversion Parameter.
o  1.1  1.2  1.5  2.0  3  6  10  20  30  50  100  200
p*  0.62  0.60  0.56  0.50  0.42  0.30  0.23  0.15  0.11  0.08  0.05  0.03
Source:  Computed  according to (2.10)
The empirical  implementation of the framework encapsulated  in expression  (2.5)
requires  an estimate  of the  cumulative  distribution  function  and  the  computation  of a
covariance.  The  cumulative  distribution  function  p=F(x)  gives  the  probability  of
observing  an  individual  with  a  living  standard  at  most  equal  to  x.  The  slope of this
7fimction  at  a particular  point  gives  the  associated  density function.  There  are  several
ways of estimating a cumulative distribution on the basis of a sample of size n, depending
on the method of adjustment for the non-continuity.  The ordinary approach is to rank the
observations  in increasing  order of the variable  of interest,  and  divide  the rank of each
observation by the total number of observations.  Let p stand for the ordinary estimate of
the CDF for observation with rank r, then we may write:
(2.11)  p= r
n
Box  2.1  Lerrnan-Yitzhaki  CDF Estimator in EViews












The  SORT  command  in  EViews  is  used  to  rank  observations  in  increasing  or
decreasing  order  of  a  particular  variable  (series).  The  syntax  is:  SORT(options)
SERIES_NAME.  The  ascending  order  is  the  default  option.  The  other  option  is  D  (for
descending  order).  EViews  also  provides  a  command,  called  CDFPLOT,  that  displays
according  to  the  option  chosen:  empirical  cumulative  distribution  functions,  survivor
functions,  and  quantiles  with  standard  errors.  In  the  context  of welfare  analysis,  the
survivor  function  gives the probability  of observing  an individual with  a living standard
at least  equal to  a specified level.  The survivor  function  is therefore  equal to one minus
the CDF.  A quantile, also known asfractile, is a level of living below which lies a given
fraction of the population.  The median is an example of a quantile to the extent that it is
the value below which lies 50 percent of the population.
Household  level  data  are  usually  available  in  the  form  of a  weighted  sample.  A
household of a given size represents  a certain number of households in the population at
large.  In  such a  case,  Lerman  and  Yitzhaki  (1989:44)  recommend  the  following  mid-
interval estimator for the CDF7.
7 Deaton  (1997:154)  proposes  a  similar  procedure  for  converting  household  ranks  into  individual  ranks.
Assuming that  there are  Whflh  people  in household  h  (where  nh  is  the  household  size and  wh  its absolute
weight),  then starting  from  pi=1,  the  rank  of the  first  person  in household  h+l  is given  by the recursive
formula:  Ph+I = Ph + nh wh . These ranks can then be normalized relative to the overall population.
8A  li  Wh
(2.12)  Fh  (X)  = E Wk  +-;  wo  = 0
k=O  2
Box 2.2 Covariance Estimator of Gini-based Measures of Welfare




SERIES DVXH=  (XH-MUX)
SERIES  DVXHW=(POPH*DVXH)/@SUM(POPH)









SCALAR EDEX=MUX*(1  -GLY)
ENDSUB
where Wh  stands  for the relative weight of each individual  in household  h in the overall
population.  This  relative  weight  is  equal  to  the  household  size  times  the  absolute
household weight divided by total population.
The subroutines  presented  in Boxes  2.1  and 2.2  can  be embedded  into  a single
program to compute members of the Gini family of indices.
Chotilcapanich  and Giffiths  (2001:543)  propose an alternative algorithm based  on
a  linear  approximation  of the  Lorenz  curve.  This  Linear-Segment  Estimator  of the
extended Gini coefficient is defined by the following expression.
m  (ok  J[  )~~~~~~Tk  Xk
(2.13)  G(  )  =  (1  )[(  -PI)'  (1  Pk-,)  ] ;  Z=  m
k=1  r/k  Er  xiX
where  Ok  iS the proportion  of welfare  for group  k and 
7 Sk iS the population share of that
group.  Note  that  the  ratio  in  parentheses  in  the  above  expression  is  also  equal
9to:  Xk  The authors of this formula present results from a Monte Carlo  experiment
j=1
showing that the linear segment approach outperforms  the covariance-based  formula only
when  applied  to grouped  data with  20 or fewer observations.  They observe  little  or no
difference  in terms of bias and mean squared error when they test both methods on data
set  with  30  or more  observations.  The  authors  state  their main  conclusion  as  follows:
"The  two  estimators  have  similar  properties  when  calculated from  individual
observations."  They further  claim: "When  using grouped data with 20 or  fewer groups,
our estimator has less bias and lower mean squared  error  than the covariance  estimator.
When  individual observations are used, or the number of groups is 30 or more,  there is
little or no difference in the performance of  the two estimators."
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10We applied the two methods(covariance  and linear  segments)  on three data  sets.
The first is the Guinea  1994  Integrated  Household  Survey covering 4,416 representative
households.  As  expected,  the claim that both methods  would produce  almost the  same
results in this case is confirmed by the results presented  in table 2.2.  Except for the case
when  the  aversion  parameter  is  equal  to  1, the  estimates  presented  in  table  2.2  are
identical up to the third decimal.
Table 2.2.  Alternative Estimates of the Extended Gini Coefficient
Aversion Parameter  Covariance Method  Linear Segments
1.0  -4.58E-29  6.47E-06
1.5  0.283868  0.283881
2.0  0.403372  0.403385
2.5  0.472096  0.472112
3.0  0.517874  0.517894
3.5  0.551041  0.551064
4.0  0.576415  0.576442
4.5  0.596588  0.596618
5.0  0.613091  0.613124
5.5  0.626898  0.626934
6.0  0.638656  0.638696
Data Source:  Guinea 1994 Integrated Household Survey
In  order  to  test  the  performance  of  the  two  methods  when  the  number  of
observations  is less that 20, we chose the extreme case of a population of two individuals
with the following levels of living (25,  75).  The results  are presented in table 2.3.  Both
methods produced very different results.  However, contrary to the conclusion reached by
Chotikapanich  and  Giffiths  (2001),  the  covariance  method  outperformed  the  linear
segment  approach.  We base  this  observation  on the  following  considerations.  In this
simple  case,  it  can  be  shown  either  by  geometry  or  by  integration  (Essama-Nssah
2000:54)  that the ordinary  Gini coefficient  is equal to  one half minus  the proportion of
the welfare enjoyed by the worse off of both individuals.  For the distribution at hand, we
therefore  know  that  the  Gini  coefficient  is  equal  to  0.25.  The  covariance  method
produces exactly this result while the linear segment approach yields a much higher value
of Gini:  0.62.  We further  tested both methods  on the  following textbook8 example of a
distribution of income in a population of four individuals (10, 20, 30, 40), again the linear
segrnent method produced much higher values compared  to the covariance method.  The
covariance  method  produced  a Gini of 0.25  while the  linear  segment  method  gives  an
estimate of 0.425.
Finally,  it is important  to note that, when the aversion parameter  is equal to one,
we  expect the  Gini  coefficient  to be zero,  the  covariance  method produces  this result,
while the linear segment method tends to yield values that are significantly different from
zero.  These results  cast  some  doubt on  the conclusion  by Chotikapanich  and  Giffiths
8  Lambert  1993b:260(2001)  that  the  linear  segment  estimator  outperforms  the  covariance  estimator in  small
samples.
Table 2.3:  Altemative Estimates of the Extended Gini Coefficient
Aversion Parameter  Covariance Method  Linear Segments
1.00  0.00  0.25
1.50  0.14  0.47
2.00  0.25  0.62
2.50  0.33  0.73
3.00  0.38  0.81
3.50  0.40  0.87
4.00  0.41  0.91
4.50  0.40  0.93
5.00  0.39  0.95
5.50  0.37  0.97
6.00  0.35  0.98
Source:  Computed
Decomposition  by Factor Components
Let's suppose  for simplicity's sake that the welfare indicator  can be decomposed
into  two  components.  For  instance,  household  expenditure  may be  divided  into  food,
xl*, and nonfood expenditure, xh . Using expression  (2.3), average social welfare may be
written as follows.
(2.14)  Vai  =  (,u  + P2) + [COV(X.,  O) + Cov(x 2,)]  = V 1 + V2
In the general case where there are m components, the above expression becomes:
m  m  m
(2.15)  Vfl  = IJu  + Ecov(x,)  = E Vj
j=1  j=1  j=1
Suppose  now  that we  choose  social weights  according  to  the maximin  principle  where
individuals  (or households) are ranked in increasing order of total expenditure.  Using the
weights defined by (2.4)  leads to the following expression for average  social welfare.
m  m  ~~~~~~~m
(2.16)  V(v) = E  j + vI  cov[xj  1 (1 - p)'-'  ] =jU 1 [1 - Cj (v)]
j=1  j=l  j=1
where  Cj(v)  is  the  extended  concentration  index  of component  j  with  respect  to  the
overall level of expenditure.
Given that  ,u =  Uj , expression  (2.16) may also be written as:
j=1
12(2.17)  V(v)=EZj  {-E1  Cj(V)  =P l-z2Cj(v)]
where  Aj  = (uj / ,).
Note  that the  second  expression of (2.16)  is obtained  by multiplication  of each
concentration  index by a  neutral  element  (P4L).  We  obtain  a different  structure  of the
same  information  by using  another  neutral  element  [G(v)/G(v)].  In that  case,  average
welfare is equal to:
m  m  m
(2.18)  V(v)  =  p,j [1- 77  (v)G(v)] =  1  - G(v)z  j  (v)
j=1  j=,  j=1
where  lj  (v)= C(v) . Comparing  expression  (2.18)  to  (2.5)  we  conclude  that  the
G(v)
extended  Gini is equal to a weighted average of the Gini Engel elasticities  is equal  to one.
That is:
m
(2.19)  E AJ17;(v) = 1
j=1
Indeed,  the  ratio of the  concentration  index  of a component  to the overall  Gini
coefficient  is  interpreted  as  an  elasticity (Lerman  and  Yitzhaki  1994,  1985;  Yitzhaki
1994a).  To see this interpretation,  rewrite the coefficient  as:
(2.20)  qj(v) =  [x 1 ,(  P)  ] ,  _  b1(v)
The coefficient  Xj is interpreted as the average propensity of component j to vary with the
overall  indicator  x.  According  to  Yitzhaki  (1994a:  457)  the  coefficient  bj(v)  may be
viewed  as a nonparametric  estimator of the marginal  propensity of component  j to  vary
with x.  This interpretation  is clearest  when the aversion parameter  is equal  to 2.  Then
we see that:
(2.21)  b  (2)=  cov(xj,p)
cov(x, p)
This is the instrumental variable  estimator of the slope parameter in the regression of the
component  xj  on  the  overall  x,  using  the  cumulative  distribution  p  as  an  instrument.
Since r%( 2) is the ratio of marginal  to average  propensity,  it is analogous to  an elasticity.
13Henceforth,  we refer to this type of elasticity  as Gini Engel Elasticity9. Assume now that
individuals  are ranked  according to  income.  If, iij(2)  >1,  commodity j is considered  a
luxury.  If the elasticity is between 0 and 1, the corresponding  commodity is considered a
necessity.  When  this  elasticity  is  negative,  the commodity  is an inferior good (Gamer
1993:  135).
Table 2.4.  Gini Elasticities  for Selected Expenditure  Components  in Guinea (1994)
Aversion  Total Expenditure  Cereals  Beverages  Food  Electricity  Energy  Non-Food
1.50  1.00  0.43  1.51  1.02  1.83  0.85  1.29
2.00  1.00  0.50  1.43  1.05  1.76  0.92  1.24
2.50  1.00  0.55  1.39  1.07  1.70  0.95  1.21
3.00  1.00  0.58  1.36  1.07  1.65  0.97  1.18
3.50  1.00  0.61  1.34  1.08  1.61  0.98  1.17
4.00  1.00  0.63  1.33  1.08  1.58  0.99  1.15
4.50  1.00  0.65  1.32  1.08  1.55  0.99  1.14
5.00  1.00  0.66  1.31  1.08  1.53  1.00  1.13
5.50  1.00  0.68  1.30  1.08  1.51  1.00  1.12
6.00  1.00  0.69  1.30  1.08  1.49  1.00  1.12
Source:  Computed
Table 2.4 presents Gini Engel  elasticities  for selected  expenditure  components in
Guinea.  This information reveals  that food expenditure is distributed very much like total
expenditure.  The distribution of expenditure  on energy is also very close to that of total
expenditure.  Beverages  and  electricity  are  clearly  luxury  goods  while  cereals  are  a
necessity.  In  general,  it  appears  that  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  household
expenditure  in Guinea is due to non-food expenditure.
The area between  a concentration  curve  and  the 45  degree  line is known  as the
area  of concentration.  It is  equal  to  - cov[xj, (1 - p)]/ pj = cov(xj, p)I ,uj.  Therefore,
r%J(2)  is  equal  to  the  area  of concentration  for xj  divided  by the  area  between  the  45
degree  line and  the  Lorenz curve of x  (Yitzhaki  and  Lewis  1996:549).  This geometric
interpretation  provides  a  necessary  condition  for  characterizing  the  position  of  a
concentration  curve relative  to the 45 degree line and the Lorenz  curve.  Thus when the
Gini Engel elasticity is negative, the concentration  curve is concave and lies above the 45
degree  line.  When  the elasticity is equal to zero,  the curve coincides with the 45 degree
line.  When the elasticity is between  zero and 1, the concentration curve  lies between the
45  degree line and the Lorenz curve.  Finally, when the elasticity is greater than one the
concentration  curve lies below the Lorenz curve.
Finally,  let  qj  stand  for  the  cumulative  distribution  obtained  by  ranking
individuals  by  increasing  order  of  component  j.  Let  GJ(v)  be  the  extended  Gini
coefficient of component  j. Expression (2.19) also implies that the overall Gini is equal to
9  Yitzhaki  (1994a)  calls  it Gini income elasticity.  Furthermore,  (2.19)  shows that Engel-aggregation  holds
for these elasticities  to the extent  that their weighted sum is equal to one.  The weights  are the shares  of the
total budget spent on each commodity.
14the weighted  average of the concentration  indices of the components,  G(v) =  AjCj(v).
j=1
If  we  multiply  each  concentration  index  in  this  expression  by  a  neutral  element
[Gj(v)/Gj(v)],  we obtain  the following  alternative  decomposition  of the  extended  Gini
coefficient:
(2.22) G(v) = EA(  G 1(v  ,j  (V)  =  jG(  (v) =  2jR j  (v)Gj (v) j=1  ~ Gj  (v)  j=1  cov[Xj  qj  j=I
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The  coefficient  Rj(v)  is known  as  the "Gini correlation"  between  component  j
and  overall  x.  This  expression  thus  reveals  that  the  contribution  of a  component  to
overall  inequality is determined  by three  factors:  (1)  the proportion  of the  component  in
the total value of x,  (2) the correlation between  the component  and the total,  and (3)  the
extent of inequality in the distribution of the component.
Figure 2.2 shows the configuration  of concentration  curves of two items  from the
1994  Integrated  Household  Survey  in Guinea.  The concentration  curve  of cereals  lies
between  the  Lorenz  curve  of total  expenditure  and  the  45  degree  line.  We  therefore
expect its  Gini  elasticity to be positive  but less than  one.  Expenditure  on beverages  is
more  unequally  distributed  than  total  expenditure.  The  corresponding  concentration
curve  lies below the Lorenz curve.  Thus we expect the Gini elasticity of beverages  to be
grater  than  one.  The  values  of  Gini  elasticities  implied  by  this  configuration  are
presented  in table 2.4.  This table  also reveals that the distribution of food expenditure  is
15very close to that of total expenditure.  Expenditures  on electricity  and nonfood items are
more concentrated  in high income households.
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3.  Truncation  by a Poverty Line
The  standard  approach  to  poverty  analysis  is  to  partition  the  population
exhaustively  into two  mutually  exclusive  groups on the basis  of a  poverty  line, and  to
assign a weight equal to zero to the wellbeing of anybody whose living standard  is above
the poverty  line.  Such  a partition  raises  at  least  two  interesting  issues.  The  first  one
relates  to  the  decomposability  of the  Gini  family  of indices,  and  the  second  to  the
interpretation of some well known poverty indices within the framework defined by (2.1).
Before  considering  these  issues,  we  first  examine  some  implications  for the  aggregate
distribution of the social weights defined by (2.4).
16Distribution of Social Weights  by Poverty Status
We focus here on how the relative social weight attached  to each of these groups
varies with the aversion parameter.  Table 3.1  contains the results of such an experiment
using household  survey data from Guinea.  We find that the poor account for  16 percent
of the  mean rank,  and  the non-poor  for  84 percent.  This stems  from the  fact  that  the
overall mean rank (i.e. the mean of the cumulative distribution) is equal to 0.5.  The mean
rank of the poor is about  0.20 while that of the non-poor is 0.70.  The weighted average
of the two numbers is equal to 0.5.  The weights used here are the respective population
shares.  When  the aversion  parameter  is equal to one,  each group receives, on average, a
weight equal to its population share.  As the aversion parameter increases  above 1, most
of the social weight is shifted to the poor.
Table 3.1.  Distribution of Average  Social Weight in Guinea by Poverty Status in 1994 and by
Level of Aversion
ShareofMeanRank  v=l  v=2  v=3  v=4  v=5  v=6
Poor  0.16  0.40  0.64  0.79  0.87  0.92  0.95
Nonpoor  0.84  0.60  0.36  0.21  0.13  0.08  0.05
Total  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Source: Computed
Decomposability  of  the Gini Family of  Indices by Population Subgroups
Truncation  by a poverty  line  implies  that the  ordinary  Gini  coefficient  can  be
written as:
(3.1)  G = (s,p,G, + s2 p2G2) + Gb
where  the term between  parentheses  represents  within  group  inequality,  while  the term
outside stands for between group inequality.  The term si measures the proportion of total
welfare enjoyed by grout i, and pi is the population share of that group.
Anand(1983:320)  shows that, in this case, between group inequality is equal to:
(3.2)  G  = n2n 2 I P  1=  ns2  L 1 [  P2 -2min(p, I  P2)]
Assuming that the first group is the poor group, then the above expression reduces to:
(3.3)  Gb = (P, -s.)
17Inequality between the two groups, as measured  by the ordinary  Gini coefficient, is equal
to the proportion  ofpoor in the population minus their income share. This is a particular
case of a  general  case we encountered  in Section  2 when testing  the covariance  and the
linear  segment  approaches  to  Gini  calculation.  In  general,  when  the  subgroup
distributions  do not overlap,  Gb  can be computed  as  the Gini  for the distribution  where
everybody has her/his group average  welfare.
Furthermore,  in  the context  of the  extended  Gini,  between  group  inequality  is
computed as follows (Yitzhaki 2002:  77):
(3.4)  Gb (v) = Pi  S  [I - (1 - p.)V]
Table 3.2  shows  the results of a decomposition of the  extended  Gini coefficients
associated  with  the  distribution  of household  expenditures  in  Guinea  in  1994.  The
decomposition  is based on (3.1)  and (3.4).  The first column of the table contains levels
of the  aversion parameter.  The second column  indicates  within group  inequality,  while
the third and  fourth columns represent between  group inequality respectively  in terms of
Gb(v)  and  its  share  in overall  inequality  (presented  in the last  colunn).  These  results
indicate that, given the poverty line,  most of the observed inequality in the distribution of
household  expenditure in Guinea is accounted  for by the between components.  When the
aversion parameter  ranges  from  1 to  6,  the share  of between  group inequality  increases
from  0  to  84  percent.  This  suggests that poverty-focused evaluation must  also pay
attention to inequality between the poor and the rest of the population.
The use of a poverty line to divide the population into two groups means that the
corresponding  distributions  of  welfare  do  not  overlap.  It  is  useful  to  note  the
decomposition of the Gini coefficient when the sub-group distributions may overlap.  The
resulting expression  suggests  an indicator of social exclusion.  Yitzhaki(1994b) proposes
an  index of the degree  of overlapping between  distributions which  allows  a more  general
and  transparent  decomposition  of the  Gini  coefficient.  In  this  general  case,  the  Gini
coefficient can be decomposed  into three distinct components:  the first component is linked
to  intra-group  inequality,  the second  is  an indicator of between-group  inequality,  and the
third is an indicator of the overlapping of the distributions.  The overlapping  index can also
be interpreted as a measure of segmentation and stratification.  Such an indicator may reveal
the extent of social exclusion of some socioeconomic  groups.
18Table 3.2. Inequality between Poor and Nonpoor in Guinea in 1994
Aversion  Within  Between  Share of  Overall
between
1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
1.50  0.15  0.13  0.46  0.28
2.00  0.17  0.23  0.58  0.40
2.50  0.16  0.31  0.66  0.47
3.00  0.15  0.37  0.71  0.52
3.50  0.13  0.42  0.76  0.55
4.00  0.12  0.46  0.79  0.58
4.50  0.11  0.48  0.80  0.60
5.00  0.11  0.51  0.84  0.61
5.50  0.10  0.52  0.83  0.63
6.00  0.10  0.54  0.84  0.64
Data Source:  1994 Integrated Household Survey
Suppose  that  a  population  has  been  divided  into  m  subgroups  indexed  by  k.
Consider any two groups j  and k.  The overlapping of group k by group j  reflects the fact
that some individuals  from group k have a standard of living that falls within the range of
the  distribution of the  living standard  within group j.  The extent of this overlapping  can
be measured by the covariance  between the level of the living standard  in group k and the
relative  rank the  members of k would receive,  had they been  considered  as  members  of
group  j.  In  this  context,  relative  ranks  are  measured  by  the  relevant  cumulative
distributions.
To see more  clearly  what is  involved,  let F(x) and Fk(x)  stand respectively  for the
overall  CDF  and  the  CDF  within  group  k.  Also  let  Fj(x)  be  the  relative  rank  that
members  of k would get had they been considered  as belonging  to j.  By definition of the
CDF, if all observations in k have a value that is less than or equal  to the minimum in the
range of group j,  Fk,(x)  would be equal  to zero.  If all  values  in group k are  greater  or
equal  to  the  maximnum  in j,  F,(x)=1.  In  either  one  of these  extreme  cases,  covk[x,
F,j(x)]=O.  This  is  the covariance  between  the  values  of x in  group  k and  their relative
rank in j.  The covariance  is calculated  using the distribution k (Yitzhaki  1994b:  149).  A
non-zero  value  of this  covariance  reflects  some  overlapping  of group k by group j.  A
normalized  overlapping  index is given by the following expression.
(3.5)  04  =  ~~~covk Ex, Fir (x)]
covk[x,Fk(x)]
The index has the  following properties:  (1) It is greater or equal to zero  and less than or
equal to 2;  (2) It is equal to one if the distribution of group j is identical to the distribution
of group  k;  (3) for  a  given  segment  of  distribution  j  that  falls  within  the  range  of
distribution k, the closer the observations of j are to the mean of k, the higher Oki.
19The overlapping of group k with the overall population  (including group k itself) is
defined as:
(3.6)  O=  covk[x, F (x)]
Covk [x, Fk (x)]
It can be shown that (Milanovic and Yitzhaki  2002:  160):
m
(3.7)  Ok  = Pk +pjOV
jok
where Pk iS  the population share of group  k.  Letting  Sk  stand for the share of group k in
total  welfare  (as  represented  by  income  or expenditure),  the  ordinary  Gini  coefficient
may be written as:
(3.8)  G = ,sk OkGk  + Gb
k=1
where  Gb  =  2 COVlUk'Fk]  is  an  indicator  of between  group  inequality.  It  is  equal  to
b
twice the covariance between the mean welfare of each group and the group's mean rank
in the  overall  distribution,  divided by the overall  mean  of the welfare  indicator.  Using
(3.7), we have:
m  m  m
(3.9)  G= ESPkGk  + Gb +ESkGk  ELpjO.I
k=1  k=1  j*k
The  first  term  on  the  right hand  side  of (3.9)  measures  within  group  inequality  as  a
weighted  average  of the  subgroup  Ginis  where  the  weights  are  equal  to  the  subgroup
population  share times the  share of welfare  (as measured by the indicator  x).  The  share
of group  k  in  x  is  equal  to:  Sk  = Pklk  . The  second  term  stands  for  between-group
A
inequality.  The  last  term,  is  an  indicator  of  the  extent  of "cross-overlapping"  [to
distinguish  it  from global  overlapping  measured  by (3.6)].  This  term  is  equal to  zero
when subgroup distributions do not overlap.
An  application  of  the  above  decomposition  to  the  distribution  of  per  capita
household expenditure in Guinea in 1994 produced the following results.
20Table 3.3  Gini Decomposition of Inequality in the Distribution of Household Expenditure in
Guinea by Area of Residence
Population  Expenditure  Mean  Mean  Gini  Global  Cross-
Share  Share  Expenditure  Rank  Overlap  Overlap
Conakry  0.17  0.31  849843.00  0.13  0.38  0.58  0.41
Other  0.16  0.20  598799.30  0.10  0.38  0.85  0.69
Urban
Rural  0.67  0.49  342785.10  0.27  0.33  0.96  0.29
Guinea  1.00  1.00  469461.30  0.5  0.40  1.00  0.00
Data Source:  1994 Integrated Household Survey.
The overall Gini index is estimated at 0.40.  The decomposition presented in table
3.3  above  implies that  the within-group  inequality  is  equal  to  0.14,  the between-group
component  is  equal  to  0.11  while the  overlapping  component  is 0.15.  Thus  about  28
percent  of the observed  inequality  in Guinea  in  1994  is  accounted  for  by the between
group component  (when the population is classified by area of residence).  Looking at the
overlapping  components,  it  can  be  seen  that  no  area  stands  out  as  a  perfect  stratum.
However,  in relative terms,  the rural  area has the least  amount of overlapping  with  the
rest of the distribution  compared  to the urban  areas.  This  fact  is  also  supported by the
pattern of mean expenditures.
The Use of  Poverty  Gaps
At  the individual  level,  poverty measurement  involves  two  basic  steps:  (1)  the
selection of a poverty line indicating a threshold below which the person is declared poor,
and  (2)  the  computation  of poverty  gaps  measuring  the  relative  distance  between  an
individual  level of welfare  and the  chosen poverty  line.  Kakwani(1999:605)  defines  a
class  of additively  separable poverty  measures  starting  from  the notion of deprivation.
Let z be the poverty line,  and xh the level of welfare  enjoyed by individual h in a society
comprising  n  individuals.  Let  xV(z,xb)  stand  for  an  indicator  of deprivation  at  the
individual level.  The following restrictions  are imposed on the indicator:  (i) it is equal to
zero  when the welfare  level of the individual  is greater or equal to that specified by the
poverty  line;  (ii)  the  indicator  is  a  decreasing  convex  function  of welfare,  given  the
poverty line.
Poverty  measures  of this  class  reflect  the  average  deprivation  suffered  by the
whole society and may be written, as:
I  n
(3.10)  P(z,x) =  - 1  /t(Z  x  )-
n h=1
The  class of poverty measured  defined  by (3.10)  is  called  additively separable
because  the  deprivation  felt by an  individual  depends  only on a fixed poverty  line  and
her/his  level  of  welfare  and  not  on  the  welfare  of  other  individuals  in  society.
21Furthermore,  if the  entire  population  is  divided  exhaustively  into  mutually  exclusive
socioeconomic  groups, this class of measures allows  one to compute the overall poverty
as a weighted average of poverty in each group.  The weights here are equal to population
shares.  Thus, such indices are also additively decomposable.
We wish to interpret expression (3. 10) in the context of the general social welfare
function defined by (2.1).  We focus our attention on one prominent subgroup of the class
of  poverty  indices  due  to  Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1984).  The  associated
deprivation function may be written as follows (Jenkins  and Lambert 1997:318).
(3.11)  YIFGT (z,  xh, a)  = max {(1-x  / z)  ,O}.
If we  define  the relative  poverty  gap of individual  h as  gh=max{(z_xh)/z,  0},  it
becomes  clear  that  in the  context  of poverty-focused  evaluation  defined  by the  Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke  (FGT)  class of indices,  the individual  poverty gap plays a dual role in
defining  both  individual  welfare  and  the  social  weights  assigned  to  the  individual  in
social evaluation.  To see this point more clearly, we rewrite (3.11)  as:
(3.12)  yfFGT(z,x ,a)  = max{I,8(1-xh  /Z),0}.
The  social  weight  attached  to  the  condition  of  individual  h  is  now  equal  to:
h=  (I-  Xh  / Z)a-
1 . The parameter a  is an indicator of aversion for inequality among the
poor.  When a=0,  the social weight  assigned to individual h is equal to: 1h= (  J- h
This coefficient  balances individual  deprivation in such a way that on the basis of (3.12),
each  poor person counts for one in social  evaluation  and  each non-poor  counts for zero.
Using expression (3.10), we find that aggregate poverty is equal to:
(3.13)  Po  1  qFGT  (Z, Xh,0)
n  h=1n
where  q is now the total  number of poor people  in the population.  Po  is a measure  of
poverty  incidence  in  the  population.  This  measure  does  not  take  into  consideration
inequality among the poor.
When  the aversion parameter  is equal  to  one,  the relevant  social weights  are  all
equal to  one,  regardless  of individual  deprivation.  Aggregate  level poverty  is given by
the poverty gap ratio defined as follows:
(3.14)  PI =-EiVfT(ZnX  -Emax(I  _ X  0 I-  )
n h=1  nl~  h=Z
where  1tp  is the average  welfare of the poor.  This  index  is also  known as  a measure  of
poverty intensity. One possible interpretation  of this indicator  is based  on the following
22considerations.  Think of x as income, and consider a situation where x is observable  and
it is possible to give everybody  a transfer of (z-x).  Afterwards,  there would be no more
poverty  as every individual would have at least an income equal to z.  Let q stand for the
number  of poor.  The total  income  transferred  to  the poor by this  operation  is  q(z-pp).
Normalizing  by the  size of the population,  we get Po(z-p.p)=zP1. Thus in an ideal world
of incentive-preserving transfers  and perfect  targeting,  zPI  is  viewed  as  the minimum
amount of resources that must be transferred,  on average,  from the non-poor to the poor
in  order  to  eradicate  income  poverty.  The  poverty  gap  ratio  does  not  account  for
inequality  among the poor.  To do so we must set the aversion parameter  to values  higher
than one.  Thus setting a=2 produces  the following estimator for aggregate  poverty.
(3.15)  P2 =imax[(x1xhPz)2,O]=(1-p/z)P+  PO
n  h= 
where  tp  and  cyp  stand  respectively  for  average  welfare  of the  poor  and  the  standard
deviation  of the  welfare  indicator  among  the poor.  If everybody  had  a level  of living
equal  to the poverty line, the average welfare of the poor would be equal to z.  The term
cp/z represents the coefficient of variation in these circumstances.  The second expression
of P2 on the  right hand  side of (3.15)  thus reveals clearly how this estimator  takes  into
consideration  inequality among the poor.
The  structure  of the  FGT  family  of poverty  indicators  reveals  that  a  poverty
indicator  translates  the  type  of concerns  policy  makers  have  about  aggregate  poverty.
Typically,  three dimensions  are  of interest:  (i)  incidence,  (ii) intensity and  (iii) inequality
among  the  poor.  Incidence  is  the  proportion  of the  total  population  living  below  the
minimum  standard,  while intensity (or depth)  is the extent  to which the well-being of the
poor falls below the minimum.  Most poverty indicators are designed to capture at least one
of these three dimensions.  Interestingly, there is a device known as the TIP curvel° which
provides  a  graphical  summary  of  incidence,  intensity  and  inequality  dimensions  of
aggregate poverty based on the distribution of poverty gaps (absolute  or relative,  Jenkins
and Lambert  1997:317).  This  curve  is constructed  in  three steps:  (1)  rank individuals
from poorest  to  richest;  (2)  form  the  cumulative  sum  of the  poverty  gaps  divided  by
population  size; and (3)  plot the resulting cumulative  sum of poverty gaps  as a function
of the cumulative population share.  Assuming that the n individuals in the population  are
ranked from poorest to richest, then for all integers k￿n  the TIP curve may be defined as
(Jenkins and Lamnbert  1997:  319):
(3.16)  JL(p)  =  g;  p=-;  JL(O)  = o
n'h=l  n
It  is  clear from  the  above  expression  that  the  computation  of the  TIP  curve  is
analogous  to that  of the  Lorenz  curve.  Figure  3.1  below  shows  a TIP  curve  for  the
distribution  of per  capita  expenditure  in  Guinea  using  the  official  poverty  line  set  at
0 TIP stands  for " three 'i's of poverty",  that is incidence,  intensity and inequality.
23Guinean francs  (GNF) 293,714 for 1994.  This curve is based on normalized poverty gaps
obtained  by  dividing  absolute  gaps  by  the  poverty  line.  The  curve  is  an  increasing
concave curve such that, at any given percentile,  the slope is equal to the poverty gap  for
that percentile.  In the general  framework  defined by (2.1)  and  (3.12), the social weight
attached  to  a  percentile  is  a  monotonic  transformation  of the  poverty  gap.  Thus  the
curvature  of the  TIP  curve  reveals  the underlying  scheme  of social  weights.  In this
normalized  case, all weights vary from a maximum of 1 for lower ranking  individuals to
a minimum of 0 for people above that poverty line.  The closer the standard of living is to
zero  the closer the  social weight  gets to one.  The closer the standard of living is to the
poverty line, the closer the social weight is to zero.
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The  curve  represents  simultaneously  the  three  basic  dimensions  of  aggregate
poverty  as  follows:  (1)  the  length  of the  non-horizontal  section  of the  curve  reveals
poverty  incidence (in  figure  3.1,  incidence  equal  about  40  percent);  (2)  the  intensity
aspect  of poverty  is  represented  by  the  height  of  the  curve;  and  (3)  the  degree  of
concavity  of the  non-horizontal  section of the curve translates  the degree  of inequality
among the poor.  The use of relative poverty gaps  allows us to read off the horizontal and
vertical axes, values of members of the FGT family.  For Guinea, intensity is estimated at
13 percent about.  This corresponds to the vertical intercept at p=1 in figure 3.1.
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Jenkins  and Lambert(1997)  explain  that  if all absolute  poverty  gaps were  equal
among the poor, the concave segment of the TIP curve would become a straight line with
slope  equal  z, the  poverty  line.  In addition, there  are  maximum and  minimum poverty
situations  that set boundaries to  the TIP curve in a manner analogous to a Lorenz  curve.
The  TIP  curve  would  coincide  with the  horizontal  axis  if there  were  no  poor  in  the
population  under consideration.  If all incomes  (or expenditures)  are equal to zero  so that
the relative poverty gaps  are all equal to one, the TIP curve would be a straight line from
the origin with a vertical intercept equal to 1 at p=l.
Table 3.4: Poverty in Guinea by Area of Residence
Poverty  Conakry  Other Urban  Rural  Guinea
Measure
Po  0.07  0.24  0.53  0.40
PI  0.01  0.07  0.18  0.13
P2 0.00  0.03  0.08  0.06
Source: Computed
The program in Box 3.1  was used to produce figure 3.1.  It requires the user to fill in
the  values  of three  arguments.  The  WORKFILE  containing  the  relevant  data,  a  GROUP
containing three series (total expenditure,  the household size and the household weight), and
a SCALAR  equal  to the poverty line.  The program can be easily edited to include formulae
25for the  three  members  of the  FGT  family  discussed  above.  In  the  case  of Guinea,  we
obtained the following results by area of residence.
The results presented  in table  3.4 reveal  that, poverty  in Guinea (as measured  by
the  FGT  class of indices)  is  essentially  a rural  phenomenon.  About  53  percent  of the
rural  population  lived in poverty  in  1994.  The  next poorest  area consists  of the urban
centers  outside  of the capital  city,  where  poverty  incidence  is  estimated  at 24  percent.
Income  poverty  is  lowest  in  the  capital  city  of Conakry  where  incidence  stood  at  7
percent.
Sen 's Measure of  Poverty
The FGT family of poverty indices relies on the coefficient of variation  in order to
account  for inequality among the poor.  This dimension  of poverty may be implemented
by combining  truncation  with the weighing  scheme expressed by (2.4).  If Gp represents
the Gini coefficient of the distribution of the living standard among the poor, according to
Sen (1997:173),  the following expression  is an indicator of welfare among the poor:
(3.17)  w,  =,u,(l-Gp)
It represents  the level  of per capita level of living,  which,  if enjoyed  equally by every
poor  person,  would provide  the  same  level  of social well-being  among  the poor  as  the
current distribution.
Table 3.5.  Guinea  1994:  Inequality  by Poverty Status
Aversion  Sen  Gini for Poor  Gini for Non-Poor  Overall Gini
1.00  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00
1.50  0.16  0.10  0.23  0.28
2.00  0.18  0.16  0.32  0.40
2.50  0.19  0.21  0.37  0.47
3.00  0.20  0.25  0.40  0.52
3.50  0.21  0.27  0.42  0.55
4.00  0.21  0.30  0.44  0.58
4.50  0.22  0.32  0.45  0.60
5.00  0.22  0.34  0.46  0.61
5.50  0.23  0.35  0.47  0.63
6.00  0.23  0.36  0.48  0.64
Source: Computed
Sen  (1997:173)  proposes  a  poverty  index  that  is  analogous  to  the poverty  gap
indicator of the FGT family.  The only difference between the two is that Sen uses wp in
lieu of [tp.  Hence the expression:
(3.18)  5 =P  Pt12  wp  6
26It is useful to  recall the axioms underpinning  Sen's poverty  index:  (l) focus; (2)
monotonicity; (3) weak transfer; (4)  symmetry,  (5)  scale invariance.  Focus requires that
the poverty measure  depend  only on the  situation of the poor.  The living conditions  of
the non-poor  are irrelevant.  Monotonicity  requires  an  increase  in  the poverty measure
whenever  the  well-being  of the  poor  decreases.  The  weak  transfer  axiom  makes  the
measure sensitive to changes in the distribution of living conditions among the very poor.
Thus,  if resources  are  transferred  from  one poor  person to  a relatively poorer  one, the
weak transfer axiom implies that the poverty measure should decrease.
The  extended  Gini  coefficient  may  be  used  in  expression  (3.18)  to  obtain  an
extended version of Sen's poverty indicator written as follows.
(3.19)  S(v) =PO [  - u,[I -GP(v)]]
Note that the generalized Sen index of poverty is analogous to the poverty gap ratio defined
by (3.14).  In fact both indices are equivalent when the aversion parameter v=1.  The results
presented in tables 3.4 and 3.5 confirm this fact for the case of the distribution of household
expenditures  in  Guinea  in  1994.  We  note that S(1)=P=0.13.  This observation  suggests
another way of extending the  Sen index of poverty.  Instead of using the extended  Gini to
measure inequality among the poor, one could use another index such as the Atkinson index
of inequality
Table 3.5 shows values of extended Sen index along with estimates for the extended
Gini  coefficient  for  values  of the  aversion  parameter  ranging  from  1 to  6.  All  indices
increase  monotonically with v.  The results also reveal that inequality is higher among the
non-poor than among the poor.
How Desirable  is Truncation?
To be sure, both the FGT and Sen approaches to poverty analysis are consistent with
the maximin  approach  discussed in Section  2.  Within  that framework,  social weights  are
assigned to individuals on the basis of some notion of social desert.  The more deserving the
individual  the higher  the  social  weight  assigned  to  her/his  situation.  The  Gini  family  of
indices implements  this idea as follows.  First, individuals are ranked in decreasing order of
social desert.  Second,  social weights are assigned according to (2.4) which describes each
weight  as  a function  of the relative  rank  of the  individual  and  the  degree  of inequality
aversion.  As revealed  by figure  2.1,  the level of aversion  for inequality implies  a cut-off
rank  such that people  before  it receive higher  social weights  than people  after the  cut-off
"  The Atkinson  index of inequality is  also based  on the concept of equally distributed  equivalent (EDE)
welfare  applied  to a specific  social  welfare  function.  In this framework,  the  difference  between average
welfare  and the  EDE welfare  is considered  as the per capita social  cost of inequality.  The Atkinson index
is  equal  to  the  per  capita  social  cost  divided  by  average  welfare  (See  Larnbert  1993b:131-138)  for
analytical details.
27point.  Our  interpretation  of  expression  (3.12)  indicates  that  the  FGT  method  does
something  very similar  subject to the  following  adjustments.  First,  the social  weights  are
now a function of the relative poverty gap.  Second, the cut-offpoint is no longer tied to the
choice of the aversion parameter, it is  imposed exogenously  by the poverty line.  Third,
everybody after the cut-off point now receives  a weight of zero, regardless  of her/his welfare
level.  Similar considerations  apply to Sen's index of poverty.  We  argue that the problem
here  is not  so  much with  the use  of the  poverty line  as  it is with  ignoring  every person
beyond the cut-off point.
It  is  evident  that  truncation  implements  Sen's  interpretation  of  the  focus
assumption.  As  mentioned  above,  this interpretation  renders the  living standard  of the
non-poor  irrelevant  for the purpose of social  evaluation.  As argued in the beginning  of
Section 2 of this paper, social evaluation is a critical input into public policy formulation
and  implementation.  Indeed  any  policy  recommendation  is  constrained  by  such  an
evaluative  input,  the  reliability  of which  is  determined  by  the  organizing  framework
(view of the world) and the quality of the data set to which the framework applies.
There  are  two  basic  approaches  to policymaking  that  shape  the  informational
needs  of the  exercise.  The  normative approach  seeks  to  maximize  a  social  welfare
function  subject  to the economy's  resource,  technology and  institutional constraints.  In
the classical  version,  the resulting  optimal program is supposed  to be implemented by a
set of competitive  and  complete  markets  given  the  prevailing  ownership  of resources
(Dixit  1996:  4-5).  In the  context  of the positive approach,  policymaking  is  viewed  as
involving  strategic interactions  among various socioeconomic  agents subject to potential
conflict and cooperation.  In this context,  Aristotle is  reported to have stated  that "It is
when equal have or are assigned unequal shares, or people who are not equal, equal
shares, that quarrels and complaints break out." (Young  1994:64).
In  the positive perspective,  a policy may be viewed  as a social contract  among
participants  which  is  enforceable  within  a  given  governance  structure.  Governance
structure involves three basic elements:(1)  abstract and universal rules of the social game;
(2) enforcement  institutions; and (3) mechanisms  for the resolution of conflicts  over both
the  rules  and  their  enforcement  (Fristchtak  1994)  2.  Any  policy  choice  entails  a
distribution  of burdens  and  advantages  that  creates  winners  and  losers.  Governance
capacity  is therefore  the  ability to coordinate  the aggregation  of these diverging  private
interests  into an outcome that can credibly be taken to represent public interest.  This is a
key consideration  in the  investigation  of political feasibility'3 of public  policy.  Such  an
investigation  pertains  to the  way gainers  and  losers  form  coalitions  and  use the political
system to their advantage.  As Kanbur (1994:8) explains it, the outcome hinges crucially on
the threshold at which a gain or a loss becomes  so significant that an individual or a group
12  This  author  further  explains  that governance  capacity  in a  modem state  may be  assessed  in
terms  of the mere existence  of such rules,  institutions  and mechanisms,  and the degree to which they  are
universal  and predictable.  Govemance  capacity  is  also  determined  by the  extent  to  which  the  state  is
autonomous vis-a-vis private interests in society.
'3  Thus  Kanbur  (1994:4)  explains  that  desirability  is  determined  by welfare  economics  while  feasibility
stems from political economy.
28feels  compelled  to organize  and fight.  At this point it may be worth distributing real or
symbolic pay-offs to the losers in order to buy social  peace.
The above  political  economy  considerations  suggest  that truncation  may be too
drastic  an  approach  to poverty-focused  evaluation.  Such considerations  imply  that  we
must not ignore the non-poor totally in our social calculus.  The Dalton principle  and its
implementation by the Gini family of indices  offer a way out of drastic  truncation.  This
framework is consistent with a milder interpretation  of the focus  assumption which now
requires only that we assign higher weights to the welfare interest of the poor relative to
that of the non-poor.  The particular range of social weights selection in the evaluation is
an outcome of the governing political process.
4.  Impact Analysis
We  view  distributional  impact  as  a  comparison  of social  states  based  on  the
associated  distributions  of pay-offs from socioeconomic  interaction.  In this Section, we
focus  on  the  welfare  impact  of public  policy.  One  particular  state,  known  as  the
counterfactual, plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  assessment  of the  impact  of policy.  By
definition,  the counterfactual  describes  the state of the world  that would have prevailed
had the policy in question not been implemented.  Thus impact assessment  involves the
comparison  of two  states  of affairs:  one  with  and  the  other  without the  policy.  This
comparison  will be based  on the welfare  criterion  defined by (2.1).  The discussion  is
organized  around  three  points:(l)  social  desirability  of  feasible  policy  reforms;  (2)
unambiguous  welfare  comparisons;  and  (3)  the  use  of  abbreviated  social  welfare
functions.
Social Desirability of Feasible Policy Options
Policy design and evaluation involve a determination  of desirable actions within a
feasible set.  Considering  the public budget as the policy instrument par excellence, the
set of feasible collective  actions must be viewed as determined by the budgetary process
in the broadest sense of the term in order to capture the political economy  dimension of
feasibility.  To  be  concrete,  we  focus  on  commodity  taxation  and  assume  revenue
neutrality.  Yitzhaki  and  Lewis(1996:543)  argue  that  this  assumption  allows  one  to
ignore  the  issue  of the  optimal  size  of government  activity.  Social  desirability  of a
feasible  action  depends  on  the  chosen  social  evaluation  criterion  or  social  welfare
function.
In general,  the impact of a policy change on the welfare of individual h, may be
analyzed within the standard model of consumer behavior.  The consumer is assumed to
choose the best bundle of commodity that she can afford.  At the optimum, this behavior
can be characterized by the indirect utility  function defined as follows:
(4.1)  vh(q,yh )=max{uh(xh)  st.  q.xh  =yh}
29where  q is a vector of consumer prices  and  yh  is  the income  of consumer  h.  One can
invoke  Roy's  identity  (Varian  1992:  106)  to  compute  the  impact of the  policy  on  the
welfare of individual h as:
m
(4.2)  dv" =-Oh(  xhdqj)+dyh
j=1
Expression  (4.2) above implies that the marginal impact,  in terms of income, of a
unit increase  in the  tax on commodity j (assumed  to be  a private  good)  is given by the
following expression:
(4.3)  mv  j=  - h  _Xi
In the case of a tax increase,  expression  (4.3)  measures  the loss imposed  on consumer h
as  the consumption rate of commodity j.  The total impact of a change in  all commodity
taxes may now be expressed  as:
m 
(4.4)  dvh =mvhdt  =-xhdq
j=I  j=1
The social impact of such a reform may be written as:
n  n  ~~~m
(4.5)  dW= 33"dv" =  hVh  3h  xhdqj
h=l  h.4  j=1
where  ph  is  now  the  marginal  social  weight  of  the  income  of  individual  h.  This
coefficient  is defined  as  8h  _(aW)  )
The change  in social  welfare  induced  by the  tax reform may be transformed  as
follows.  First,  we  change  the  order  of summation  in  (4.5),  then  we multiply  by  the
n
neutral element  (xj/xj) where  xj  = Exi is the aggregate  base of the tax on commodity j.
h=l
This transformation leads to the following expression:
m  ,  phXh
(4.6)  dW=-ExjE  -w  dqj
i  h=1  Xi
To  further  apprehend  the  structure  of the  change  in social  welfare,  we need  to
consider the impact of the tax reform on the public budget.  Government  revenue is equal
to:
30m
(4.7)  B = Ztjxj(q,y)
j=I
where  xj(q,y)  is the demand  for commodity j  (the  tax base)  as  a  function of prices and
incomes.  A  small  change  in  all  taxes  leads  to  the  following  change  in  government
revenue.
(4.8)  dB  tj  rjdtj
Where  r; is the marginal revenue  associated  with  a change  in the  jlh tax.  The marginal
tax reform  may be  characterized  by a  vector  of tax  changes  dt,  or by  a vector of tax
revenues  6.
Revenue-neutrality  implies  that  dB=O.  Given  that q  is the  vector  of consumer
prices,  we have dt=dq.  According  to  (4.8), we  may write  dqj =  Lj  . This implies  the
r.
following expression for the change in social welfare:
(4.9)  dW = -E  d
Three important parameters  are embedded  in the above expression.  The first one reveals
the distributional  characteristic  of commodity j.  The parameter is  defined as  (Mayshar
and Yitzhaki  1995:795):
e
flhxh
(4.10)  DCj  h=l  2 0
The second parameter  is the marginal  efficiency cost of funds collected through taxation
of commodity j.  It is defined as:
(4.11)  MECFj = X1 1  l  1
ri  1+-  tk 
xj  k=1  8t 1
Slemrod and Yitzhaki  (2001:6) explain that this parameter  is an indicator of the extent of
leakage  from the tax base (hence  efficiency cost)  associated  with adjustment in behavior
by the taxpayer in response  to  the change in tax burden.  This may be thought of as an
31incentive  effect of the tax on j.  The marginal efficiency cost is equal to the ratio of the
cost of funds to the taxpayers to the value of the funds going to the public treasury.
The third parameter is the marginal social cost of funds defined as follows:
fi a  h  hE  x  hx
(4.12)  MSCFj =  __  __  h-  __  =  Xj  ( 
The  above  expression  reveals  that  the  marginal  social  cost  of funds  is  equal  to  the
distributional  factor times the marginal  efficiency  cost of raising funds through  a tax on
commodity j.




(4.13)  DCj =  _h  __  h=1  ]6___j  _6
When  social  weights  are  chosen  according  to  (2.4),  then we  know  that  . 1p=l  and  the
second term within the brackets  is equal to minus  the extended concentration  coefficient
of commodity j.  Therefore,  the marginal social cost of funds for this commodity is equal
to:
(4.14)  MSCFj = MECFj  [1- Cj (v)] = MECFj  [1- i7j (v)Gx (v)]
The impact of the tax change on social welfare is thus equal to:
m
(4.15)  dW = -EMSCF, 5j
j=1
m
The policy  option is  feasible  if dB = E,j  > 0  has a nontrivial  solution.  It  is  socially
j=1
desirable  if  dW2O.  The  final  determination  rests  on  the  specification  of the  social
weights  ph.  If we impose only minimal restrictions  on social weights, then a wide  class
of social welfare  functions would agree  on the characterization  of the policy option.  This
situation corresponds  to dominance ranking.  However,  the  selection of a unique  set of
weights allows one to assess all policy options on the basis of the implied criterion.
Unambiguous  Welfare  Comparisons
As noted  above, social desirability depends on the value judgments  underpinning
the social  welfare  function.  Such judgments  can take the form  of restrictions placed on
32the social weights  ph.  Suppose that we adopt  an individualistic  welfare  function of the
type defined by (2.1) subject to the restriction that Pbh 2 0 for each h.  A Pareto-improving
tax reform  would have to  improve the welfare of at least one  individual without hurting
any.  This  could  be  characterized  in terms  of (4.4)  using  the implication  of (4.8)  that
dqj =-  . A  Pareto-improving  marginal tax  reform  must  satisfy the  following  (n+l)
linear restrictions:
m  m
(4.16)  dB =Xj  2 0;  dvh  =  Xh(x  /xj)MECFjj  Ž  0  Vh
j=I  j,=
The above  expression  reveals  that the marginal  impact of the reform  on consumer  h  is
equal to minus the weighted sum of modified  consumption shares.  The weights  are the
marginal  tax receipts  i,  while the modified  consumption  share of each  commodity  are
obtained  by  multiplying  each  share  by  the  corresponding  marginal  efficiency  cost  of
funds.
As  noted  in Section  2,  the  Dalton principle  may  be built  in the  social  welfare
function  by first  ranking  individuals  according  to  some  criterion  of social  desert,  then
assigning social weights  in  such a way that  of any  two individuals  the  more  deserving
receives  a higher weight.  To  see clearly  what  is  involved,  consider  a  society of three
individuals ranked from the poorest to the richest.  Under the Dalton principle, the pattern
of social weights is  :PI1Ž2i3P3.  Given that social weights  are now chosen  such that each
is nonnegative  and adjacent  ones satisfy (p-I-Phb)>O  it is desirable to express  the welfare
improving  condition  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  this  restriction.  Mayshar  and
Yitzhaki (1995:797)  show that a Dalton-improving  policy may be characterized  in tenns
of cumulative marginal impact.
The cumulative marginal impact is defined as:
(4.17)  cmv  =ZdvL;  i = 1,  2, 3.
i=1
By definition,  dvh = cmvh  - cmvh'.  The change in social welfare  due to a marginal tax
reform is thus equal to:
3
(4.18)  dW =/hdvh  =(/,  -3
2 )cmv'  +(,/32  _/  )cmv 2 +/63 cmv3
h=1
Expression (4.18) is a sum of cross products.  The first term of each product is known to
be nonnegative.  It is therefore clear that if the second term is also nonnegative the whole
sum will be nonnegative  as well.  The reform will be welfare  improving  (i.e.  dW20)  if
each cmvh >0.  The condition for Dalton-improvement may thus be stated generally as:
33m
(4.19)  dB = E  5j 2 0;  cmvh 2 0  Vh
j=1
The condition for Pareto-improvement  implies that for a Dalton-improvement,  but not the
other  way  around.  Mayshar  and  Yitzhaki(1995:798)  emphasize  that,  within  this
framework,  the social ranking is exogenous and need not be based on  income.  They
further note that when the ranking is based on income,  the Dalton criterion  is equivalent
to the second degree dominance criterion based on the generalized Lorenz curve.
To  further  expose the  structure  of the Dalton criterion,  on the basis of (4.9)  we
write the cumulative marginal impact as  follows.
h  m  h
(4.20)  cmv'  =h  dv'  = - Si E(x';Ixj)MECFj
1=1  jI=1  1=1
In  the  above  expression,  the  term  (x; / xj )MECFj represents  a  point  on  the
i=l
concentration curve of commodity j scaled by that commodity marginal  efficiency cost of
funds.  Thus  (4.20)  shows  that  the design  of a  Dalton-improving  indirect  tax  reform  is
equivalent to  searching for a vector 8 such that Yj8j2O  and the 8-weighted  sum of scaled
concentration curves  for the commodities is everywhere  non-positive'  .
Let's now focus  on the simple two-commodity case  where commodity k is taxed
in order  to subsidize  the  consumption  of commodity  s  while keeping the  public budget
balanced.  The revenue  neutrality constraint  implies  that  (oS+8o=0.  The  condition  for
Dalton-improvement  may thus be written as:
h  h
(4.21)  _(x5 /Ix,  Xk  ),  MECFk  5  0  Vh
Since  o, is negative by assumption,  the reform will be Dalton-improving  if the modified
concentration  curve for commodity s  lies nowhere below that for commodity k.  We may
say that commodity s Dalton dominates commodity k.  If the two commodities happen to
have  identical  positive MECFs15, then we need only compare the ordinary concentration
curves.  It is in fact the relative magnitudes of the MECFs that determine whether to use
14 Mayshar  and  Yitzhaki(1995:  800)  propose  the  following  algorithm  in  the  case  of  strict  revenue-
n  ~~~~~~~~~2
neutrality.  min  [maxk- cmv'  (3), 0)] st.  ,  j  = 0; 3,  0.  A  solution  is achieved  when  the
J  h=1  ~~~~~~~~j=1
objective  function is equal to zero  for nontrivial values of the vector  6.  In fact the  constraint  that 8170 is
meant to avoid trivial  solutions.  The authors  further explain that one must compute  two sets  of solutions
for positive  and negative  values  of 6,.  Since  the  scale  of the  reform can  be set  arbitrarily,  this  implies
checking  solutions for 51=1  and for 51=-l.  Finding a solution for these two values means that there  exists a
Dalton-improving tax reform that does not involve a change in the tax rate of commodity  1.
15  Estimates of MECFs are known to be sensitive  to changes  in the  structure  of preferences  (Mayshar  and
Yitzhaki  1995:803).
34the ordinary concentration curves or the modified ones.  It is instructive to note that, if the
concentration  curve  of commodity  s  lies  nowhere  below  the  Lorenz  curve  of total
expenditure  (or income),  then  a subsidy on this  commodity financed  by a proportional
income tax would increase welfare (Yitzhaki and Slemrod 1991: 486).  In the same spirit,
Yitzhaki and Thirsk  1990:14) explain that a tax on wages may be interpreted  as a tax on
all expenditures made by  workers.
Finally, to focus only on efficiency considerations,  we look at cmvn.  In the case
of a revenue neutral reform involving two commodities,  expression (4.20) implies that:
n
(4.22)  cmv"  = Xdvh = -(MECF, -MECFk)35 20
This expression  reveals that the neutral  tax reform  involving  a subsidy  for commodity s
will reduce deadweight  loss if MECFs>MECFk.
There is a necessary condition for Dalton improvement based on Gini elasticities
of the two commodities involved.  Recall  that if commodity  s dominates  commodity  in
terms  of expression  (4.21),  then  it must  be  true  that  the  area  of concentration  of s
multiplied by the marginal efficiency cost of s must be less than the area of concentration
of commodity k times its marginal efficiency cost.  This condition may be stated in terms
of concentration  indices as follows.
(4.23)  - [C 3 (v)MECF, - Ck(v)MECFk  ]  O  0
Based  on definition  (4.11),  we write  the  ratio of the  marginal  efficiency  coefficients  as
_MECFk
aSk  =  . Using the definition of the Gini Engel elasticity,  the necessary condition
-MECF,
for Dalton improvement can be expressed as:
(4.24)  - [q, (v) - ask  m7k(v)]GX (v) 2 0
This condition can be used to narrow  down the set of commodities on which to perform
pairwise  comparisons  of modified  concentration  curves  (Yitzhaki  and  Thirsk  1990:9).
When both commodities have identical MECFs, then the necessary condition  for Dalton
improvement presented in (4.22) reduces to the following inequality:  M  (V)  < 7k (V) .
Condition (4.21)  can be verified graphically by plotting on the horizontal axis the
cumulative proportions of individuals  in the income distribution, and on the vertical  axis
the difference  between  the  concentration  curve  of commodity  s  and  the  concentration
curve  of commodity  k,  multiplied  by  ask.  Yitzhaki  and  Slemrod(1991)  call this  the
DCC(p) curve (the "difference in concentration  curves" curve).  This curve starts at (0,0)
and  ends  at  (1,  1- ao).  If it lies  everywhere  above  the horizontal  axis,  commodity  s
dominates  commodity  k;  if  it  is  located  entirely  below  the  horizontal  axis,  then
commodity k dominates s.  If the curve crosses the horizontal line, there is no dominance
to speak of.
35The  DCC(p)  curve  allows  a  combined presentation  of both the  efficiency  gain
from the reform and its distribution among income groups.  If the curve is increasing at p,
then individuals  located  at that percentile  gain from the policy.  If the curve is decreasing
then they are losing from the reform.  DCC(1)=(1-  ak)  provides an indication of whether
the  cumulative  gain  for the whole  society is  positive,  zero  or negative.  The  outcome
hinges on how ask compares  to  1.  When this ratio  is equal to one, the policy reform  is
neutral with respect  to efficiency (no efficiency  gain, nor loss).  However,  if the DCC(p)
curve lies above the horizontal axis for all other values of p, we conclude that the policy
is welfare improving (in the sense of Dalton) on account of distribution.  When DCC(1)<
0  (implying  that ask>l)  condition  (4.21)  cannot  hold for all h,  since it fails  to  hold for
h=n.
It is useful  to note that the same methodology can help analyze the case where  a
subsidy is financed by a proportional  income tax.  In this case, we have to compare  the
concentration  curve for commodity s to the Lorenz curve of  the income distribution.
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To  illustrate  the  point,  we  compare  the  distributional  characteristics  of  two
commodities,  cereals  and  beverages,  using  data  from  the  1994  integrated  household
survey from Guinea.  Figure 2.2  shows the concentration  curves of the two commodities
along with the Lorenz distribution of total household expenditure.  It is evident from that
figure  that  the  consumption  of cereals  in  Guinea is more  equally distributed  than  total
consumption  and  the  consumption  of  beverages.  Not  having  estimates  for  relative
efficiency costs, we proceed  as if ask were equal to one (the case of neutrality vis-a-vis
efficiency).  Under  this assumption,  we would expect  welfare  dominance  to the  extent
that the  concentration  curve  for  cereals  lies  totally  above  the  concentration  curve  for
36beverages  over the  entire range of the cumulative  distribution  of per capita expenditure.
Figure 4.1  confirms  this view.  It  plots the  difference  between the  concentration  of the
consumption  of cereals  and  that of beverages.  The  DCC  curve  lies entirely  above  the
horizontal axis, thus it would be socially desirable to implement  a commodity tax reform
that would  shift the tax burden away  from cereals  and towards beverages  while keeping
the public budget  balanced.  In addition,  figure  4.1 reveals  that at least  85 percent  of the
population  would benefit from such a move.
It  is  useful  to  note  the  concept  of TIP  dominance  in the  context  of truncated
analysis.  Given a poverty line z, if a TIP curve  a lies entirely over another TIP curve b,
we say that a TIP-dominates b.  In other words,  there is more poverty in situation  a than
in situation  b, regardless of the dimension we choose to  focus on: incidence, intensity or
inequality among the poor, and for all poverty lines less than or equal to z.
Figure 4.2. A TIP Comparison of Poverty in Guinea by Area of Residence
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Figure  4.2  illustrates  the point  with  three  TIP  curves  for three  population  sub-
groups  in Guinea based on the area of residence  of the household  in  1994:  (1)  Conakry,
the  capital  city;  (2)  other urban  centers  and (3)  the rural  area.  The dominance  relation
among  these  curves  reveals  that,  regardless  of the  dimension  considered,  poverty  in
Guinea  (as measured  by the  FGT  class  of indices)  is  essentially  a rural  phenomenon.
About  53 percent of the rural population lived in poverty in 1994.  The next poorest  area
consists  of the  urban  centers  outside  of the  capital  city,  where  poverty  incidence  is
estimated  at 24 percent.  Income  poverty is lowest  in the  capital city of Conakry  where
incidence stood at 7 percent.
37Our  discussion  of TIP  curves  focuses  on  the  FGT  class  of poverty  indices.
However  it is worth noting that Jenkins  and Lambert's  (1997)  results are more general.
Consider the class of Generalized  Poverty Gap (GPG)  poverty indices.  The members  of
this class  are  increasing  Schur-convex'  functions  of absolute  poverty  gaps  given  the
poverty  line.  In  addition,  these  indices  are  replication  invariant.  A sub-class  of these
indices,  GNPG,  is defined  on normalized  poverty  gaps (e.g.  FGT).  As it turns  out, TIP
dominance based on absolute poverty gaps is equivalent to a unanimous poverty ordering
by  all members  of the  GPG class,  and for  all poverty lines that are at most equal to the
chosen one 17.
Use of  Abbreviated Social Welfare  Functions
Dominance  criteria  provide  a  general  framework  for  identifying  unambiguous
rankings  of social  states  in terms of the  distribution of the living  standard.  However,  the
relation  of dominance  is  a partial ordering in the  sense  that it  could  fail  to  rank  two
situations.  For instance  when two concentration  (or Lorenz)  curves intersect,  we loose the
ability  to  draw  unambiguous  conclusions  about  the  inequality  or  welfare  content  of the
distributions  under comparison.
Sen (1989:  18) explains that the dorminance  approach to social evaluation provides a
minimal partial  order on the  focal  space.  The Pareto  improvement  test  discussed  above
(based  on the  social  welfare  function  defined  by 2.1)  is  an  example  of such  a minimal
ordering  to  the extent  that it requires  only non-negative  social  weights.  Sen  (1989)  also
explains that it is possible to go beyond the scope of this minimal order by further restricting
social  weights  to lie within  a particular  range.  The Dalton criterion,  for instance  further
restricts the admissible range associated with the Pareto  criterion.  The narrower the range,
the  more  extensive  the  overall  ranking  will be in comparison  to minimal dominance.  A
social  evaluation  function  based  on  a unique  set of weights  (e.g.  2.5)  would  induce  a
complete  ordering  of socioeconomic  states.  The weights  in question  are a reflection  of
the underlying value judgments.  These value judgments determine  the structure of index
numbers used to assess the inequality and social welfare effects of a policy based on induced
distributional  changes.  In  the  end,  the  selection  of evaluative  weights  boils  down  to
priority setting  among the different  dimensions of the quality of life (e.g.  components  of
consumption)  and among diverse individuals or groups (within resource and institutional
constraints). In this subsection we focus on index numbers based on the maximin principle,
and on  normalized  poverty gaps.
16  By analogy  to  Schur-concavity  in the case  of inequality  and welfare  which ensures  that inequality  falls
and welfare  increased  when  the  distribution  of resources  is  "smoothed"  by  equalizing  transfers,  Schur-
convexity require that poverty fall when poverty gaps are smoothed (Jenkins and Lambert  1997).
17  Jenkins  and  Lambert(1997)  also  reveal  a  close  link  between  the  poverty  orderings  based  on  TIP
dominance  and  those  associated  with  generalized  Lorenz  dominance.  They  show  that  distribution  a
dominates distribution b on the basis of the generalized  Lorenz curve if and only if the TIP curve for b lies
nowhere below  that of a,  for all  common  poverty lines  z.  The generalized  Lorenz  curve  is  equal to the
ordinary Lorenz curve times the mean of the corresponding  distribution.
38Changes in the Abbreviated Social Welfare Function
When an economy undergoes a shock (exogenous or policy), its structure  and the
implied distribution of welfare may change significantly.  In the particular case of policy
reform,  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of a  policy  proposal  depend  essentially  on  the
implications  of the  proposal  for  efficiency  and  equity.  We  may used  the  abbreviated
social  welfare  function  defined  by  (2.5)  to  track  the  effects  of a policy.  To  simplify
matters,  we  focus  the  analysis  at  the  margin.  Consider  therefore  the  enactment  of a
policy  that  leads  to  marginal  changes  (dxn)  in  the  living  standard  of the  population
involved.  The logic  behind expression  (2.5)  leads us to the following assessment  of the
induced welfare impact.
l  n
(4.25)  dV(v) =-,  w' (v)dx4  = Hla  + v cov[a,(l -p)]
n h=1
where a stands for the distribution of marginal benefits induced by the reform.
The above expression is equivalent to the following'8:
(4.26)  dV(v) = Iia [1- Ca (v)] = Ia  [1-  7a (v)G.  (v)]
where  17a (v) = G  (  ) is the ratio of the concentration  of marginal benefits to the overall
Gx (v)
Gini index of inequality in the distribution of the living standard prior to the reform.
Expression (4.26)  shows that  a first-order  assessment  of the welfare  impact of a
policy reform  within the maximin  framework  can  be based  on three  parameters:  (1) the
average marginal benefit of the reform (ta),  (2) the overall Gini index of inequality Gl(v)
and  (3)  the  Gini  Engel  elasticity  of the  marginal  benefit  of the reform  la(v).  A  Gini
Engel elasticity greater than one means that the distribution  of marginal benefits  is more
unequal  than  the  initial  distribution  of the  living  standard.  Therefore  the  reform  is
inducing  more  inequality.  This  distributional  effect  will  lower  welfare.  The  overall
impact depends on the sign and size of the average benefit.
When  the  living  standard  is  composed  of different  components,  we  may  be
interested  in  welfare  changes  due  to  a  change  in  one  component.  Kakwani(1995:5)
provides  a  way of computing  the  elasticity of V(v)  with  respect  to  the  mean  of the  jlh
component.
(4.27)  SK  ,j  [l - G(v)] +  j [G(v) - Cj (v)]  X  G(v) - Cj  (v) 1 - [1  pK (v]
J  ~~~~u[l  - G(v)]  +  1-G(v)
According to Kakwani(1995:5)  this elasticity,  which measures the effect of a change  in the
jlh  income component on total welfare  and may be interpreted  as the sum of the "income"
and the inequality effect.  The income  effect is equal to the share of the component in total
expenditure  (or  income)  Xj,  while  the  inequality  effect  is  equal  to  this  share  times  a
18  The expression is obtained by factoring out pa and multiplying the resulting  concentration  coefficient  by
the  neutral element  [GX(v)/Gx(v)].  Also note  the  analogy between this expression  and  that of the marginal
social cost of funds (4.14).
39progressivity  index  denoted  by  PK (v).  A  positive  value of this  index  means  that  the
change in the jth component is progressive in the sense that it favors the poor more than the
rich.  A negative  value implies regressivity.  If the change  in the jlh income component is
distributed  in proportion  to total  income,  its concentration  index  will be equal to  the Gini
index  and the progressivity index will be zero.  In this case neither the rich nor the poor are
favored.  This progressivity index may guide the design of an optimum tax (or expenditure)
policy.  The  methodology described  here may also be used  to  evaluate the  effect of price
changes on total welfare
Poverty Impact
One  may be  interested  in  analyzing  the poverty  impact  of policies  and  shocks
based on poverty indices such  as those of the FGT family.  As a general rule,  the poverty
impact  of a  policy  depends  on  the  degree  of targeting.  Options  range  from  perfect
targeting  to no targeting  at  all.  In the extreme  case of no targeting,  any effect of policy
on the poor  is  linked to  the "trickle  down mechanism".  However,  policy makers  may
resort  to  a  coarser  approach  to  targeting  based  on  a  broad  definition  of population
subgroups  (Kanbur  1987a:72).  Such policies will affect both the poor and the non-poor
within the targeted socioeconomic  group.  For instance, price support for a particular crop
will  affect both  poor and  non-poor  farmers  engaged  in the  cultivation  of the  crop.  A
subsidy  on  a  particular  food  item  will  affect  all  those  who  are  consuming  it.  At  the
margin, such an analysis relies on the derivatives of the poverty indices used with respect
to changes in the welfare  indicator.  For the  FGT family of indices, the first derivative of
the poverty gap with respect to the welfare indicator is equal to:
(4.28)  8xFGT  - mi  a (1-  Xh  /Z-l  o aXh  1z)'
1
and the second derivative is:
(4.29)  a2 VFGT  max{ _(a  )  Xh-  /-Z)al  a >1
For positive values of the  aversion parameter,  these derivatives  indicate that members  of
the  FGT  family  of  indicators  are  non-decreasing convex  functions  of  the  welfare
indicator.
Kanbur(1987a:73)  notes  that  a  policy  may  have  either  an  additive  or  a
multiplicative  effect  on the level of individual  welfare.  Consider  first the  additive case.
Policy implementation  changes  all levels of welfare  to (xh+t),  so that individual  poverty
19  See Kakwani (1995:5-7) for details
40gaps  are  now  equal  to:  yIFGT (Z, X,  a) = max {(1 - (xh  + t) / z)a,0} . This  implies  the
derivative of the poverty gap with respect to t is equal to:
dFGT  -min.{--(1 - (XI + t)  / z)a  ,0} 
dt  +t/z  'O}
This suggests that the derivative of the average poverty gap with respect to t is equal to:
dP,  a  aI~  a
(4.30)  dt  = _x ( _-  max[(1 -(xh  +t)/z),O]) = -- P
Kanbur interprets this expression as the shadow price of budgetary expenditure  when one
is seeking to minimize  Pa subject  to a budgetary  constraint.  When a=1, the  amount by
which  poverty  intensity  changes  when  the  welfare  indicator  increases  marginally  is
proportional to the head count ratio, i.e.  Po.
If policy implementation  has a multiplicative  effect  such that post policy welfare
is equal to  (1+t)xh, then it can be shown  that the derivative  of the average poverty gap is
equal to:
(4.31)  ~dP.  a  (Jp  _Pa<
(4.31)  dt  1+t  al_  )<o
This  expression  makes  the  shadow  price  of budgetary  expenditure  proportional  to  the
difference between  Pa..l and Pa.
Another interesting aspect of poverty impact analysis  relates  to the responsiveness
of poverty to growth  and changes  in inequality.  Given that poverty indices  are computed
on the basis of a distribution of living standards, which is fully characterized  by the mean
and the degree  of inequality, it is reasonable  to think  of a poverty  index as a  function  of
these  two  factors.  Indeed,  procedures  have  been  developed  for  the  decomposition  of
changes in poverty into growth and inequality  components (Ravallion  and Datt,  1992).
For  small  changes  and  under  the  assumption  that  the  Lorenz  curve  shifts
proportionately  over the whole range of income  distribution, Kakwani (1990)  shows that
the total  percentage  change  in  a poverty  index  is  equal  to  the growth elasticity of the
index times the percentage  change in the mean income plus the elasticity of the index with
respect to the Gini times the percentage  change in the Gini coefficient.  He further shows
that the growth elasticity of the head-count  index is equal to:
(4.32)  17H  - f(Z)  < 0
H
Where  f(z)  is the density function of the welfare  indicator  evaluated  at the poverty line.
The elasticity with respect to Gini is:
41(4.33)  £  z)  qH
z
For  the  general  class  of  additively  separable  poverty  measures,  the  growth
elasticity is given by the following expression.
(4.34)  17  p  EWhXhV  A  )
The elasticity with respect to Gini is:
(4.35)  E  P=Tw  r  - Wh:
P  h=  I  )  XhJ
These  elasticities  may be used  to  evaluate  the potential  for poverty reduction.
Indeed,  a  higher  growth  elasticity  means  a  greater  potential  for  poverty  reduction.
Focusing  in  particular  on  poverty  incidence,  it  can  be  seen  from  (4.32)  that  the
responsiveness of the head-count index to growth depends essentially on the initial value
of the index and the slope of the distribution function  at the poverty line.  The higher the
initial  head-count,  the  lower  the  elasticity  and  the  higher  the  actual  rate  of  growth
required to further reduce poverty (other things being equal).
In the particular case of the FGT family of indices, these elasticities are equal to:
(4.36) 
7 FG  =  ;  FGT  1FGT  ap  a>.
Pa  ~~~~ZPa
On the basis of expressions (4.35) and (4.36) the total impact of growth and redistribution
on income poverty may be written as:
(4.37)  dP  d,u +  dG
(4.37)  ~~P  =1p  I 
Ravallion (1994b) argues that the above decomposition may lead to large errors in
the case  of big discrete  changes.  A different approach  is therefore  required.  Instead of
summarizing  inequality  by the Gini  index,  one  may use  a parameterized  Lorenz  curve
along with the mean income to decompose  changes in poverty into growth and inequality
components, and a residual".
20  Ravallion and Datt (1992)  note  that the existence  of this residual depends on whether or not the poverty
index  is  additively  separable  between the mean and the  Lorenz curve.  The residual  would vanish if the
mean income or the Lorenz curve remained constant over the decomposition period.
42The  growth-inequality relationship  thus  seems  fundamental  in  analyzing  the
dynamics  of poverty.  If growth  is  distributionally  neutral,  poverty  is  expected  to  be
reduced  on  such  a  path21. If one  drops  the  neutrality  assumption,  then  the  outcome
becomes  ambiguous.  In this case the  distributional  impact and the poverty implications
depend  essentially  on  the  initial  structure  of  the  economy  and  the. profile  of  the
adjustment process.
5.  Conclusion
This paper  sought  to  demonstrate  how  one might  perform  distributional  impact
analysis within a poverty-focused evaluative  framework.  The approach  is illustrated with
household  level data from Guinea, using EViews as a computing platform.  The  focus on
poverty  is  important  for  at  least  two  reasons.  Widespread  poverty  in  the  developing
world  remains  a serious  challenge  for the  development  community.  Furthermore,  the
ethics  of  empowerment  which  underpins  current  development  thought  entails  the
expansion  and  the  distribution  of socioeconomic  opportunities  with  implications  for
individual  and  collective  well-being.  These  considerations  have  prompted  the
development  community  to  make  poverty  reduction  a  fundamental  objective  of
socioeconomic  development,  and  a  benchmark  measure  of the  performance  of various
social  arrangements.  In  this  context,  poverty  is  seen  as  the  deprivation  of  basic
capabilities  to lead the type of life one has legitimate reasons to value.
Any evaluation  is characterized  by the underlying  criterion.  The object of social
evaluation  is  the  determination  of the  extent  to  which  prevailing  social  arrangements
promote  individual  and collective well-being.  This requires  identification  of the objects
of value,  and  an  aggregation  rule  for  the  comparison  of social  states.  The  need  for
aggregation  raises  the fundamental  issue of weights  to  attach  to  each constituent of the
aggregate.  The choice of social weights is based on value  judgments.  If one believes that
an  incentive-preserving  transfer of resources  from rich to poor would  increase collective
well-being,  then  the  maximin principle provides  an  adequate  foundation  to  a  poverty-
focused  evaluation.  When  implemented  in  the  context  of additively  separable  social
welfare functions, the principle  leads to social evaluation functions that are decomposable
into  two  components  revealing  both  the  average  living  standard  and  its  distribution
among the population.  The  distribution  component  is  equal  to  the  covariance  between
the  living  standard  and  the  social  weights.  Thus,  the  maximin  approach  to  social
evaluation  offers a way of combining both efficiency and equity considerations  in social
evaluation.  In  addition,  the  linearity  of  the  covariance  operator  allows  a  factor
decomposition  of the inequality components on the basis of the constituents of the living
standard.
Further  specification  of  social  weights  is  needed  to  determine  the  extent  of
poverty  focus of the evaluation.  The Gini  family of indices provides  a weighing scheme
based on relative ranks of individuals  (according  to some  criterion of social desert),  and
on  a  focal  parameter  indicating  the  degree  of aversion  to  inequality.  This  aversion
21  The time frame is important in this context as  we should distinguish between short and long-run impacts
associated respectively with fluctuations in output,  and steady-state growth in capacity output.
43parameter also determines a cut-off rank such that people below the cut-off point receives
higher  weights  than  people  above  it.  In  that  sense,  the  standard  approach  to  poverty
analysis based on the truncation of the distribution of the living standard by a poverty line
is  quite  consistent  with  the  maximin  approach.  However,  this  truncation  appears
undesirable on political economy grounds.
The  criterion  presented  in  this  paper  can  guide  the  identification  of desirable
policy options.  This  entails a ranking of social  states on the basis of the values  assumed
by the criterion in each state.  The scope of the ranking  depends  on the acceptable  range
assigned  to  social  weights.  This range  is  a  reflection  of the  extent  of the  restrictions
placed  on the social  weights.  The milder  the restrictions,  the  more robust the. implied
comparisons.  This is the  essence  of the dominance  approach to evaluation based on the
comparison  of  distribution  functions.  When  dominance  fails,  one  can  resort  to
abbreviated  social  welfare  functions.  Such  functions  usually  translate  the  concept  of
equally  distributed  equivalent  (EDE)  welfare.  Gini-based  evaluation  functions
incorporate  a  focal  parameter  that  summarizes  the  underlying  value judgments.  This
parameter can be used in sensitivity analysis.
In  the  end,  the  selection  of evaluative  weights  boils  down  to  priority  setting
among  the different  dimensions  of the quality  of life  and  among  diverse  individuals  or
groups (within  resource  and institutional  constraints).  The maximin  approach illustrates
the  link  between  social  weights  and the underlying  value judgments.  It is important to
note that in the selection of evaluative weights,  one has a choice between a technocratic
and  a  democratic  approach  (Sen  1999).  The  ethics  of  empowerment  imply  a
determination  of explicit  evaluative weights from a participatory approach  based on open
public debate involving  all concerned.  This seems  to be one of the sure ways to  detect
the  value  system  that  commands  respect  among  the  participants  in the relevant  social
arrangement.
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